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Abstract
Background: Consumer mobility is an important aspect of a health insurance system based on managed competition.
Both the general population and insured with a chronic illness should enjoy an equal opportunity to switch their
insurer every year. We studied possible differences in the rates of switching between these two groups in the
Netherlands.
Methods: A structured questionnaire was sent to 1500 members of Nivel’s Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel
(response rate: 47%) and to 1911 chronically ill members of the National Panel of the Chronically ill and Disabled
(response rate: 84%) in February 2016. Associations between switching and background characteristics were estimated
using logistic regression analyses with interaction effects.
Results: In general, we did not find significant differences in switching rates between the general population and
chronically ill population. However, a combination of the population and background characteristics demonstrated that
young insured with a chronic illness switched significantly less often than young insured from the general population
(1% versus 17%).
Conclusions: Our results demonstrated that the group of young people with a chronic illness is less inclined to switch
insurer. This observation suggests that this group might either face difficulties or barriers which prevents them from
switching, or that they experience a high level of satisfaction with their current insurer. Further research should
therefore focus on unravelling the mechanisms which explain the differences in switching rates.
Keywords: Switching, Health insurance, Managed competition, Chronic disease, Choice, Consumer mobility, Health
system reform
Background
Over the last decade many OECD countries have imple-
mented elements of managed competition in their health
care systems [1, 2]. For the Netherlands, a prominent ex-
ample for managed competition, the health care reform
in 2006 is recognised as an important structural health
care reform [3]. This reform played a major role in the
shift from supply-side government regulation to man-
aged competition. It was based on a concept developed
by Enthoven in 1978 [3–5].
The Dutch government’s reforms of the health insur-
ance market was aimed at solving several structural
problems, for instance the growth in health expendi-
tures, the lack of competition, and the lack of pressure
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on suppliers to achieve better performance [3, 6]. Based
on Enthoven his concept of managed competition, the
Dutch government formulated several goals for the
Health Insurance Act (HIA). First, the HIA should lead
to increased expediency and more freedom of choice for
all insured. Second, it should decrease the government’s
central control of health insurance provision. The third
aim was that the HIA must guarantee good accessibility
of care for all [7]. An important aspect of the HIA is the
possibility to switch health insurer [8]. All insured are
allowed to switch insurer or insurance plan every year,
during an annual enrolment period. People can switch
insurer for (1) the universal basic insurance, which has a
government-determined content across all plans, (2) the
supplementary insurance, or (3) for both. Those insured
who are dissatisfied with their current plan or look for a
plan that meets their preferences and needs better could
opt for another insurer. People can for instance switch
because of the premium, content of the supplementary
insurance, premium discount for the voluntary deduct-
ible (See Table 1) and/or level of service. The assump-
tion is that every insured person, whatever their
characteristics, such as age or chronic illness, has the
same opportunity to switch [9]. The insured would then,
in theory, incentivize health insurers to meet their pref-
erences regarding price, quality and contracted health
care [10].
Several safeguards were introduced in order to achieve
an equal opportunity to switch health insurer, both for
the general population and those insured suffering from
a chronic illness (from here on mentioned as chronically
ill population). These safeguards are outlined in Table 1.
The underlying idea is that differences in nominal pre-
mium rates between health insurers reflect differences in
efficiency and not differences in the insured population.
Among others, these safeguards impose that health in-
surers are obliged to accept all applicants for a basic
package, while this is not the case for the supplementary
insurance. Moreover, for the basic package there is an
obligation to apply community rating when calculating
the nominal premium, thus accepting everyone for the
same premium which implies that applying different pre-
miums for different risks (risk rating) is forbidden for
the same insurance policy. Risk equalization is used to
compensate health insurers for differences in the risks
present in their insured population. For instance, a
health insurer with an overrepresentation of patients
with high expenditures receives more compensation
from a central fund. A well-functioning system of risk
equalization should avoid health insurers to focus on
attracting low-risk insured or try to cream-skim on qual-
ity in order to attract low-risk patients. The Dutch risk
equalization formula is widely regarded as a sophisti-
cated instrument. To a large extent, it mitigates the
higher or lower expenditures caused by case-mix differ-
ences between health insurers [11]. However, recent re-
search highlights shortcomings in risk equalization [12].
For instance, someone with a chronic condition as dia-
betes resulted in an average loss of 221 euros for the
health insurer. Imperfect risk equalization may
incentivize risk selection among health insurers [13].
In 2016, the year of this study, 25 different insurers
were on the market offering together 61 different insur-
ance policies. For all insurers the basic package has the
same content but might differ in price (See Table 1). Al-
though the purchaser side of the health insurance mar-
ket is highly regulated by the government, health
insurers are allowed to selectively contract health care
providers which offer the best value for money ratio
[14]. The government created more freedom to negoti-
ate with health care providers, for instance by the major
increase in freely negotiable hospital prices. This results
in in-kind plans, for which not all providers are fully re-
imbursed. In practice, most of the healthcare providers
are still contracted by most health insurers. If the com-
bination of safeguards described in Table 1 work as
intended, both groups should be equally attractive to
health insurers and health insurers will feel little incen-
tive to engage in risk selection [15]. Furthermore, there
would be no barriers for those insured with a chronic ill-
ness to switch health insurer.
Table 1 Health insurance in The Netherlands [3]
Basic insurance:
− National government yearly determines the content of the basic
insurance policies
− The content is identical for every basic insurance
− The basic insurance is compulsory for everyone living or working in The
Netherlands aged 18 years and above
− Health insurers are obliged to accept everyone regardless their age,
health status and place of residence
− Premium differentiation is prohibited
− Insured have the possibility to switch once a year between health
insurers
− Distinction between policies with full reimbursement of all health care
providers (reimbursement policy) or policies with partly reimbursement of
the non-contracted health care providers (in kind policy)
− Mandatory deductible of 385 euro in 2016. This does not apply to care
that is reimbursed by any supplementary insurance, or for a few types of
care in the basic insurance, such as GP care.
− Possibility to choose for a voluntary additional deductible of 100, 200,
300, 400, 500 euros to decrease the monthly premium.
− The basic insurance is an extensive package covering, among others, GP
care, hospital care and maternity care
Supplementary insurance:
− The supplementary insurance covers, among others, physiotherapy for
non-chronic illnesses, dental care and additional reimbursements for
medicines
− Voluntary, not necessarily taken out at the same insurer as the basic
insurance
− Insurers are not obliged to accept everyone
− Premium differentiation is allowed for the supplementary insurance
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In this study, we will compare the rates of switching
between the chronically ill population and the general
population in 2016. Here, switching is defined as the
switch from one insurer to another insurer. Making an
adjustment to a plan with the same health insurer
organization is not defined as switching in the current
study. Switching between health insurers has been stud-
ied before, mainly in the Dutch setting [8–10, 16]. How-
ever, these studies show ambiguous results concerning
the frequency of switching in the general population and
the chronically ill population. One study showed a sig-
nificantly lower switching rate between insurers among
the chronically ill population in comparison to the
healthy insured, however, this effect disappeared when
corrected for age [9]. Three other studies found no sig-
nificant differences between the two groups, but showed
that the chronically ill population may experience bar-
riers to switching [12, 13, 17]. Furthermore, research
among the general population showed that younger
people, more highly educated people, and people with a
better perceived health condition, switch health insurer
more often than older, lower educated and insured with
a worse perceived health condition [18].
Our study aims to contribute to the current body of
evidence on the switching behavior in three ways. First,
to date the role of age, level of education and perceived
health condition on the behaviour of switching is gener-
ally well established for the general population, but to a
lesser extent for the chronically ill population. This re-
search aims to address this paucity by establishing the
relationship between the attributes and switching behav-
iour for both populations. Second, in the recent years,
important steps have been taken by government bodies
and health insurers to create equal possibilities to switch
health insurer. Therefore, as earlier research is based on
data from ten years ago, conducting a study based on
up-to-date data is relevant in order to assess whether
there are differences in switching rates. Third, the as-
sessment of switching behaviour in the Dutch health in-
surance market provides a relevant case both for all
countries with a health insurance market based on man-
aged competition, and for all countries considering
introducing such a system. Both should determine
whether the chronically ill population switches to the
same extent as the general population as this gives
insight into whether the system works as intended.
The following two research questions will be answered
in this article:
Q1: Are there differences in switching rates between
chronically ill population and the general population?
Q2: What is the role of the background characteristics
age, level of education and perceived health condition in
explaining the switching rates for the chronically ill and
general population?
The switching rates for the chronically ill population and
the general population
The main idea behind switching insurer is either that
the insured will search for a new insurer because they
are dissatisfied with the premium or quality of health
care offered by their insurer, or because another health
insurer offers a better option [10]. The insured are ex-
pected to search for information about price or quality
in order to find a new health insurer. Information re-
lated to price is generally easier to find and compare
than that related to quality [7, 19]. For the general popu-
lation, it is easier to select a new health insurer since
they will tend to use less health care and thus can focus
more on differences in the insurance premium. By con-
trast, the chronically ill population will tend to use more
care, and, in particular, more specialised care than the
general population [20]. Therefore, it is important for
the chronically ill to have a health insurer who provides
a high quality of care and access to their preferred health
care providers. Consequently, the chronically ill popula-
tion is expected to consider both price, quality and
contracted providers when choosing a new health in-
surer. They will thus have to invest more time, should
consult more sources, and might face more uncertainty
after a switch [21]. As such, it could be reasoned that
the switching costs, in terms of time and effort, are ex-
pected to be higher for the chronically ill population
than for the general population. On the other hand, it
could be reasoned that a switch could also result in
higher benefits for the chronically ill population, since
their focus is related to aspects other than price. Fur-
thermore, in comparison to the general population, the
chronically ill population may feel more concerned that
their claim for their supplementary insurance could be
rejected when they switch. This might decrease the
switching rates among the chronically ill population [22,
23]. Although the empirical literature does not demon-
strate a consistent relationship, we hypothesize, based
on the theory, that the general population will switch
more often than the chronically ill population.
Hypothesis 1: The general population switches more
often than the chronically ill population.
The role of age, level of education, and perceived health
condition
Empirical research demonstrates the positive relation-
ship between the level of education and the propensity
to switch between health insurers [24]. More highly edu-
cated people seem to switch more often than those with
a lower education. The research on insurer choice dem-
onstrates that a higher level of education leads to in-
creased search activity compared to a lower level of
education [25–27]. Second, more highly educated people
have a better ability to reflect critically upon the
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information they have found, which makes it easier for
them to make a choice [28].
Previous studies have also found that older insured
people are less likely to switch in comparison with youn-
ger ones [9, 10, 29]. Being older is often accompanied
with more uncertainty about the use of health care in
the upcoming year. This can make the choice of a new
health plan, in general, more complicated. For the older
insured, choosing a new insurer may also be more com-
plicated since they may be less capable of searching and
processing information as fast compared to younger in-
sured people, resulting in higher switching costs for the
older insured [30, 31]. Higher switching costs decrease
the chance of switching insurer. Furthermore, the older
insured might switch less because they have often been
insured for a long time with their current insurer. They
are, therefore, familiar with the procedures of their
current insurer and this will thus decrease the likelihood
of switching since they want to avoid the regret and un-
certainty which may accompany switching [32].
The role of perceived health condition on switching
behaviour has similarities with the role of having a
chronic disease but differs on the point that it refers to a
more time dependent and self- reported measure instead
of an objective measure as diagnosed by a general practi-
tioner. For instance, people with a chronic illness can ex-
perience a good subjective health status. All
combinations between both measures can occur. Here,
the insured with a worse self-perceived health condition
might look further than only a lower price offered by an-
other health insurer and search for an insurer who
matches their specific preferences. This search for infor-
mation is more complicated and demands more time.
We expect, therefore, that people with a better perceived
health condition will switch more often than people with
a worse perceived health condition.
Hypothesis 2a: More highly educated people switch
more often than lower educated people.
Hypothesis 2b: Younger people switch more often than
older people.
Hypothesis 2c: People with a better self-perceived
health condition switch more often than people with a
lower self-perceived health condition.
Having a chronic disease plays a major role in choos-
ing a health insurer [33]. The demand for specific care
makes the chronically ill population more focused upon
quality over price. Therefore, it can be argued that pos-
sible variation in the switching rates could be ascribed
mostly to the presence of a chronic disease instead of
background characteristics. Thus, we expect the influ-
ence on switching rates of the background characteris-
tics, age, level of education, and health condition, to be
larger in the healthy population compared to the chron-
ically ill.
Hypothesis 3: Age, level of education, and perceived
health condition, play a larger role among the general
population compared to the chronically ill population.
Methods
Data
Questionnaires were sent to members of two panels of
Nivel (the Netherlands Institute for Health Services Re-
search). One, the Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel
(DHCCP) represents the general population while the
other, the National Panel of the Chronically ill and Dis-
abled (NPCD), represents the chronically ill population.
In February 2016, a questionnaire was sent to 1500
members of the DHCCP. A total of 703 members
returned the questionnaire (response rate: 47%). In April
2016, the same questions about switching were sent to
1911 members of the NPCD. A total of 1596 members
returned the questionnaire (response rate: 84%). Accord-
ing to their previously stated preferences, members re-
ceived a questionnaire by post or through the internet.
Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel
The DHCCP is a so-called access panel managed by
Nivel. The panel aims to measure opinions on, and
knowledge about, health care and the expectations and
experiences with health care in the Netherlands [34]. In
2016, the panel consisted of approximately 12,000 mem-
bers aged 18 years and older. Many background charac-
teristics of the panel members are known, such as their
age, gender and the highest level of education com-
pleted. New panel members are recruited on a regular
basis to renew the panel. Renewal is necessary to make
sure that members do not develop specific knowledge of
specific health topics. It is not possible for people to en-
roll themselves in the DHCCP. Switching rates measured
in the DHCCP are comparable with those among the
whole Dutch population based on administrative data
[35]. The DHCCP contains members with a chronic ill-
ness (see Table 2). In contrast to the diseases among the
panel members of the NPCD which are diagnosed ob-
jectively, the chronic diseases among the DHCCP panel
members are self-reported.
National Panel of the Chronically ill and Disabled
The NPCD was introduced by Nivel to give insight into
patient perspectives on living with a chronic disease or
disability in the Netherlands. In 2016, the panel con-
sisted of approximately 3500 people above 15 years of
age with one or more chronic diseases and/or with a
physical disability. Participants with chronic diseases are
selected from random samples of general practices in
the Netherlands. The inclusion criteria are: a diagnosis
of a somatic chronic disease, aged 15 years or older; not
being permanently institutionalised; being aware of the
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diagnosis; not being terminally ill (life expectancy more
than 6months according to the general practitioner
(GP)); being able mentally to participate; and having suf-
ficient mastery of the Dutch language. Self-enrolment
for the panel is not possible.
New panel members are recruited annually to replace
participants who withdrew or had participated for the
maximum term of four years. In addition to the self-
reported demographic characteristics provided by the
panel members, GPs provide medical information about
the panel members, with the patients’ consent, about the
chronic diseases diagnosed and the dates of the diagno-
ses. For this study, we selected panel members aged 18
years and over who had been diagnosed with at least one
chronic disease.
Privacy
The data collection is registered with the Dutch Data
Protection Authority for both the DHCCP and the
NPCD (nr. 1,262,949 and nr. 1,283,171, respectively). All
data were collected and handled in accordance with the
privacy protection guidelines of the Authority. Data were
processed anonymously. A privacy regulation applies for
both panels. According to Dutch legislation, neither
obtaining informed consent, nor approval by a medical
ethics committee, is mandatory for carrying out research
in both panels [36].
Measurements
Dependent variable: switching
Switching was measured by asking the respondents
whether they had switched to another health insurer
during the period of enrolment for 2016 (November
2015–February 2016). The question about switching (see
Additional file 1 for exact question) is part of Nivel’s an-
nual monitor about the switching behaviour of insured
in the Netherlands. The original question consisted of
five mutually exclusive categories, of which the respon-
dents could choose only one. The five categories were 1)
Not switched, not considered switching; 2) Not
switched, considered switching; 3) Switched solely for
the basic insurance; 4) Switched solely for the supple-
mentary insurance, and; 5) Switched for both the basic
and supplementary insurance. In our analysis switching
is divided into two categories: the original options 1 and
2 were re-coded in not switched (coded as 0), while the
original options 3, 4 and 5 were re-coded in switched
(coded as 1). We created this combined variable for
switching since the number of insured in both panels
(NPCD and DHCCP) who switched for solely the basic
insurance (n = 16), or solely the supplementary insurance
(n = 4) was rather low.
Independent variables
We used the following independent variables to test our
hypotheses: Age, 18–39 years (coded as 0), 40–64 years
(coded as 1), and 65 years and older (coded as 2); level
of education, low (coded as 0), intermediate (coded as
1), high (coded as 2); perceived health condition, very
good/excellent (coded as 0), good (coded as 1), bad/poor
(coded as 2); and, general population (DHCCP) (coded
as 0), or chronically ill population (NPCD) (coded as 1).
In our analyses, the chronically ill population thus refers
to the membership of the NPCD. In addition, sex (0 =
male, and 1 = female) was included as an independent
variable.
Analyses
Corrections
Before analysing the switching rates in the two panels,
corrections were made to make the samples comparable.
A weighting factor was calculated for the NPCD to make
the sample representative of the Dutch population of
people with a chronic illness, based on the proportion
between the number of chronically ill people and the
number of disabled people in the population [37]. In
order to draw comparisons between both panels, we
reweighted the chronically ill population to line up with
the distribution of age, sex and education in the general
population. This reduced the possibility of finding differ-
ences in the switching rates caused by differences in the
distribution of background characteristics such as age,
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
General population
(N = 703)
Chronically ill population
(N = 1593)
Age
18–39 21% 15%
40–64 50% 38%
65 years and
older
29% 47%
Education
Lower 15% 32%
Intermediate 54% 45%
Higher 31% 23%
Perceived health condition
Bad 14% 34%
Good 53% 53%
Very good 33% 13%
Sex
Male 50% 43%
Female 50% 57%
Chronic illness
Yes 28% 100%
No 72% 0%
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level of education and sex between the two panels.
Therefore, a new variable for the chronically ill popu-
lation was used for the combination of the three vari-
ables: age (three groups, 18–39, 40–64, 65 years and
older); sex (male, female); and, level of education
(lower, intermediate, higher) thus resulting in 18 sep-
arate weighting factors.
Table 2 demonstrates descriptive statistics showing
chronically ill population among the NPCD panel are, in
general, older and lower educated, compared with the
general population. Furthermore, the uptake of supple-
mentary insurance in both populations is similar (87% in
the DHHCP and 86% in NPCD). In the general popula-
tion, 28% reports a chronic illness. Among the group of
DHCCP members with a chronic illness, 80% suffers
from one self-reported illness, 18% from two and 2%
from three or more illnesses.
Statistical analyses
First, descriptive analyses were performed to determine
the switching rates for the different background charac-
teristics among the two groups. Both weighted and un-
weighted switching rates were presented. Second, we
performed a logistic regression analysis to test our hy-
potheses about the differences in the switching rates be-
tween the two populations and the role of background
characteristics in this (Hypothesis 1, Hypotheses 2a-2c).
A model was estimated in which switching functioned as
the dependent variable, while age, sex, education, self-
perceived health condition, and population, functioned
as independent variables. Third, a second model was es-
timated to test whether the role of the independent vari-
ables, such as age, level of education, and perceived
health condition, and the switching rates differ between
the general population and the chronically ill (Hypoth-
esis 3). To test this, interaction effects were added to our
first model. To determine whether switching rates dif-
fered significantly between the two panels, odds ratios,
marginal effects and p-values were reported. Significance
levels were set at 5%. For all analyses, STATA version
14.0 was used.
Results
Table 3 shows that 7% of the general population
switched health insurer during the enrolment period in
2016. Among the chronically ill population, 4% switched
insurer. When we examine the switching rates in the dif-
ferent age groups, we see that in the general population
17% of the insured aged between 18 and 39 years,
switched. Among the chronically ill population, 1% be-
tween 18 and 39 years switched insurer. In both groups,
more highly educated people and people with a very
good or excellent perceived health condition reported
the highest switching percentages.
To test our Hypotheses 1 and 2a-2c, we performed a
multivariate logistic regression analysis with switching as
the dependent variable. The results in Table 4 demon-
strate that the general population did not switch signifi-
cantly more than the chronically ill population.
Hypothesis 1 was therefore rejected. Furthermore, there
was no difference in the switching rates between lower
and higher educated people. Hypothesis 2a is therefore
also rejected. The insured with a very good or excellent
perceived health condition did not switch more often
than the insured with a bad or poor perceived health
condition. As such Hypothesis 2c is rejected. However,
the results indicate that the younger insured switched
more often than the older insured. As a sensitivity ana-
lysis, we performed a regression analysis for the switch-
ing rates in the DHHCP only (Additional file 2). There
are no significant differences in switching rates between
people with a self-reported chronic illness or without a
chronic illness among the general population with
regards to rates of switching, which is in accordance
with the results found in the two-panel comparison.
Hypothesis 3 was tested by adding the interaction
terms between all the independent variables (level of
education, age, and perceived health condition) and
population (general/chronically ill) to our first logistic
regression model. As can be seen in Model 2 of Table 4,
the interaction between age and group is significant.
Further evaluation of the age effect in the chronically ill
subgroup, achieved by changing the reference category
(not shown in table), reveals that the switching rate among
this subgroup is a little higher in the 40–64 group com-
pared to the group of 18–39. In addition, further evalu-
ation of the age effect demonstrates for the general
population that switching decreases with age. Further-
more, it appears that the insured aged 18–39 years in the
general population switch significantly more compared to
the same age group among the chronically ill population.
Discussion
This study investigated the differences in the behaviour
of switching between the general population and the
chronically ill population, the role the background char-
acteristics, age, level of education and perceived health
condition, played in this, and the possible different role
of the background characteristics among these two
groups.
Switching insurer
The current study found that 7% of the general popula-
tion, and 4% of the chronically ill, switched insurer in
2016. However, when we took age, sex, perceived health
condition, and level of education into account, no sig-
nificant differences in switching rates between the gen-
eral population and chronically ill population were
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found. The general switching rates found in our study
are particularly low compared to other consumer mar-
kets such as the switching rate found in the Dutch en-
ergy market (16%) in 2016 [38, 39]. However, they are in
line with the switching rates found previously in the
health insurance market in the Netherlands [10, 40, 41].
A possible explanation is that only a few insured are
willing to consider switching health insurer each year
[42].
We hypothesised that differences in the level of educa-
tion, age and perceived health condition would result in
differences in switching rates (Hypothesis 2a, 2b and 2c).
The results showed only an effect with regards to age.
The results are in line with the findings in previous stud-
ies that younger people switch more often than older
people [9, 10]. In contrast to earlier findings, however,
this study found no significant effect of the level of edu-
cation (Hypothesis 2a). A possible explanation for this
might be that a higher level of education might make it
easier to process the information but does not tell
whether more highly educated people search more infor-
mation. The level of education as a measure for search
behavior on its own, might be insufficient in explaining
variation in switching.
The combination of the population and background
characteristics (Hypothesis 3) demonstrates a difference
in the age effect between the panels. The young insured
with a chronic illness switched significantly less than
young insured from the general population (1% versus
17%). They report the lowest rate of switching of all the
groups compared in this study. One possible explanation
for the low rate of switching amongst the youngest
group of chronically ill people is the amount of time and
effort which is taken up with choosing a health insurer.
Having a chronic illness makes it necessary to select a
health insurer which offers a good quality of care and
access to the preferred doctor to safeguard continuity of
care. This is especially the case when people are recently
diagnosed with their chronic condition, which is more
likely in the youngest age group. For this group, the
choice might be thus more complicated and time con-
suming [7, 19]. Research into how people use their time
in the Netherlands demonstrates that people aged be-
tween 18 and 40 years spend the most time on work and
obligatory activities and have the least spare time of all
age groups. This is especially true when people have
children [43]. The combination of a complicated
choice and time constraints might make the young
chronically ill less inclined to switch. At the age of 18
people must select their own health insurance plan,
which might explain the high percentage of switchers
among the people between 18 and 40 years within the
general population.
Further research
Our results provide insight into switching rates for dif-
ferent groups ten years after the introduction of man-
aged competition in the Netherlands. However, in the
design of the current study, underlying mechanisms
were not included. Therefore, future studies should
ideally include attributes that might explain these differ-
ences, such as search behaviour, perceived barriers and
possible switching costs. To explain the possible benefits
of staying at the current insurer, satisfaction and loyalty
are recommended for inclusion in further research to fa-
cilitate a better understanding of the differences in the
switching rates. As earlier research indicated, group con-
tracts, and having a supplementary insurance, play an
important role in the consideration to switch health
insurer as well [44, 45]. It is advised to assess whether
consumers apply changes in supplementary insurance or
group contracts without switching from insurer to
Table 3 Weighted switching percentages (confidence intervals in brackets, unweighted percentages for the chronically ill
population in italic) a
General population Chronically ill population
Switching rate Total 7% (5–9%) 4% (3–6%) 4%
Age 18–39 17% (11–24%) 1% (0–4%) 2%
40–64 5% (3–7%) 6% (4–8%) 6%
65 years and older 4% (2–7%) 3% (2–6%) 3%
Education Lower 2% (0–8%) 5% (2–9%) 4%
Intermediate 6% (4–9%) 4% (3–5%) 4%
Higher 10% (7–15%) 5% (3–8%) 5%
Perceived health condition Bad 5% (2–12%) 5% (3–8%) 5%
Good 5% (3–8%) 4% (3–6%) 4%
Very good 10% (7–15%) 3% (1–7%) 3%
aThe weighted results are not presented for the general population. We matched the chronically ill population to the distribution of age, sex and education
among the general population. As such, the weighted and unweighted results are equal for the general population
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insurer. Second, our study examined only the actual
switching rates. High rates of intentional switchers can
also send a clear signal to health insurers as the actual
switching rates themselves [18]. Therefore, examining
the people who intended to switch but refrained in the
end, might provide an explanation for the low percent-
age of switchers among specific groups in future re-
search. Third, to conclude, it can be recommended to
examine switching behavior in a longitudinal setting, as
this makes a contribution to the current body of litera-
ture by providing insight into the influence of life events,
for instance being diagnosed with a chronic condition,
on health insurance decision making.
Implications for policy
Yet, it is unclear if the switching rates found in our study
are sufficient to create enough competition between
health insurers [17, 18]. It is important to mention that
low switching rates on the health insurance market are
not necessarily related to problems with the accessibility
of care or a lack of consumer choice [46]. After all, a
low switching rate may also be the result of a perfectly
Table 4 Multivariate logistic regression with switching as the dependent variable
Model 1: Switching
Pseudo R2 = 0.03
N = 1961
Model 2: Switching
with interaction terms
Pseudo R2 = 0.06
N = 1961
Switching (1 = yes. 0 = no) Odds Ratio P-value Marginal Effect Odds Ratios P-value Marginal Effect
Age 18–39 Reference 0.08 Reference 0.06
40–64 0.64 0.10 0.05 0,26 0.00* 0.05
65 years and older 0.44 0.01* 0.04 0,25 0.00* 0.04
Education Lower Reference 0.05 Reference 0.04
Intermediate 0.97 0.91 0.05 2,33 0.27 0.05
Higher 1.45 0.24 0.06 3,38 0.12 0.06
Perceived health condition Very good Reference 0.06 Reference 0.05
Good 0.78 0.36 0.04 0.66 0.22 0.04
Bad 1.02 0.95 0.06 0,85 0.76 0.05
Group General population Reference 0.06 Reference 0.06
Chronically ill population 0.67 0.08 0.04 0.16 0.10 0.04
Sex Male Reference 0.05 Reference 0.05
Female 0.82 0.37 0.05 0.93 0.83 0.05
Age * group 18–39 *
general population
– – – Reference 0.13
40–64 *
chronically ill population
– – – 13.23 0.00* 0.06
65 years and older *
chronically ill population
– – – 7,07 0.01* 0.03
Education*group Lower*
general population
– – – Reference – 0,03
Intermediate*
chronically ill population
– – – 0,38 0,25 0,04
Higher*
chronically ill population
– – – 0,36 0,24 0,05
Perceived health condition
* group
Very good*general population – – – Reference 0,07
Good*
chronically ill population
– – – 2,03 0,26 0,04
Bad*
chronically ill population
– – – 1,90 0,40 0,05
Sex*group Male*general population – – – Reference 0,06
Female*Chronically ill population – – – 0,91 0,84 0,04
Constant 0.12 0.00* 0,09 0.00*
*p < 0,05
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functioning health insurance market or a high level of
satisfaction among the insured, which decreases their
propensity to switch [46]. Also, it can be argued that
high switching rates are not a favourable alternative,
since this might increase the expenditures of health in-
surers. Based on the current research, we could not con-
clude if the safeguards mentioned before worked as
intended to guarantee equal accessibility.
However, a switching percentage of 1% among the
young chronically ill is remarkably low, and suggests that
this specific group, or at least a part of it, might face bar-
riers which may refuse them to switch. In addition, there
might be the risk that a switching percentage of 1% is
not sufficient to put pressure on the health insurers to
meet the preferences of the young chronically ill. Add-
itionally, it is likely that some of them would financially
be better off by switching [47]. Although we did not
examine how complicated decisions are for the insured,
it can be reasoned that the health insurance system is
complex [7, 47]. In 2016, the insured could choose from
more than 61 policies for the basic insurance offered by
25 health insurers [48]. Comparing the different policies
will be difficult when more policies are on the market
for which not all providers are contracted. It is import-
ant to be sure, especially for the chronically ill, that
their usual provider is contracted in the chosen insur-
ance policy and to have insight into the selection cri-
teria for contracting a health insurer. This demands
effort, time, and the capacity to make the right
decision.
The Netherlands’ Scientific Council for Government
Policy (WRR) recently pointed out that taking action, for
example, switching health insurer, not only depends
upon people’s mental capacity, but also relies heavily on
the ‘acting capacity’ [49]. Acting capacity refers to the
ability to set a goal and take action [49]. This would in-
dicate that the provision solely of clear information
might thus not be sufficient to convince the insured to
consider switching. Following the observation of the
WRR, advice can be formulated in order to support
switching health insurer in the system, in particular for
the young chronically ill population. For instance, De
Bekker et al. (2017) suggested that the insured should be
encouraged to reflect on their health insurance every
year, and should be stimulated to look for better options
to make an informed choice [50]. Moreover, the govern-
ment has been advised to provide more tailored infor-
mation which would acknowledge the diversity between
groups of people and the differences in the provision of
services they require [51].
Conclusions
Our study showed that the young chronically ill (18–39)
switched the least of all groups. This observation
suggests that this group might face difficulties or barriers
which might prevent them from switching, or that they
experience benefits from staying with their current in-
surer. Further research should therefore focus on unrav-
elling the mechanisms which can explain the differences
in switching rates between groups of insured. Govern-
ment policy should focus on encouraging people to re-
flect on their current health plan every year. Providing
tailored information about aspects other than price, such
as the quality of care, should simplify the process of
choosing a health insurer, especially for the young
chronically ill.
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